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I. Of Pride and Prejudice 
Panicularly in times of latent - or not-so-latent - scepticism towards the United 
States, we tend to stress what di stingui shes Europeans from Americans and to down-
play what we share, Certainly, even in times of friendship and sympathy, "old 
Europe" might sometimes find it difficult not to scoff at some of the more peculiar 
aspects of the American dream. But today, when anti-Americanism is rampant, we 
not only scoff; we are rolling our eyes and ask ourselves: How could they? 
Of course, thi s attitude applies first and foremost to the field of politics, and the 
"war" on terror in particular. But transatlantic differences have also become more 
accentuated in technical areas: In the legal field, for instance, we certainly find 
American tort law - or rather its excesses - most difficult to accept. We all have 
heard of the elderly lady drying her dog in the microwave or pouring hot coffee on 
.. Lic. iur. el phi!., M.PhiL, Auomey-at-Iaw. Research Fellow al the lnslirute of Public IntemaLionaJ Law, 
UlliversilY o f Zurich. I would like 10 thank Teresa Kam for her suppon . and Prof. Dr. Daniel Thilrer for in-
troducinglhe writings of Judge Learned Hand 10 me. thus sparking my interesl in lhe First Amendment. 
135 
her lap at McDonald's and, subsequently, reaping millions and millions in compensa-
tion. A close second in evoking utter bewilderment on this side of the Atlantic is 
probably the issue of free speech. How could anyone possibly protect racist speech 
on campus, when the basic values of academic education should be tolerance and 
equality?' How can a supremacist be permitted to bum a cross in the yard of a black 
family, after all the persecution, lynching and discrimination that America has in-
flicted upon its minorities?' And, perhaps most unsettling, how can a court protect 
the right of a neo-Nazi party not only to hold a parade, but to hold it in a neighbour-
hood where numerous survivors of the Holocaust have settled?) 
We find it difficult to understand such leniency toward what we perceive as racist 
behaviour and hate speech. In most European countries, these actions would lead to 
criminal persecutions under legislation specifically enacted to combat racism and 
intolerance: And this , in the European view, is perfectly reconcilable with the right 
to free speech: As Art. 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights states, 
the exercise of the right to free speech carries with it duties and responsibilities and 
may be subject to restrictions or penalties prescribed by law and necessary in a de-
mocratic society in the interests of, inter alia, public safety, the prevention of disorder 
or crime, the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others. Thus, the Convention acknowledges that freedom without any limits 
becomes freedom for a selected few, who exercise their right at the expense of every-
one else. Consequently, we believe that freedom of expression needs limits to ensure 
that speech does nOt turn into a weapon. And a most powerful weapon it can be: At 
the beginning of the unspeakable horrors of the Third Reich stood, after all, a racist 
ideology that was successfully spread through both the written and spoken word. 
Gi ven such risks, the American approach seems grossly negligent, and oblivious to 
the dangers that unbridled speech may carry both for society as a whole and for indi-
viduals who might be the victims of vicious speech. 
Still. the atrocities that we fear to ensue from free speech have. so far. mostly taken 
place on this side of the Atlantic, and not in the United States. And perhaps we 
should, before shaking our heads over the American legal system in general and its 
free speech regulation in particular, strive to get a better understanding how exactly 
I Doe v. University of Michigan , 72 1 F. Supp. 852 ( 1989). The University or Michigan had prohibited 
speech sligmatising or victimising others on grounds of, inter alia, race, erhnicity, religion or sex. Doe. a 
psychology graduate student. successfully chaJJenged the policy, arguing that it prevented him from discuss-
ing conLfoversial theories pOSiting biologically-based differences between sexes and races (at 858). 
1 RA V. l' City of SI. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1991) . Ou rhis case, see infra n. 104 and accompany-
ing !eX t. 
3 National Sociolisl Parry of America et al. l'. Village of Skokie , 432 U. S. 43 ( 1976). The PallY wanted 10 
hold a parade in Skokie in a predomi nanLly Jewish neighbourhood. An injullction against such a parade was 
held uneonstilulional . For details, see HOROwrrz. First Amendment Blues. 535. 
For an over.·iew of relevanl European legislation, see SAlO, Frame work, passim. ef. also SWISS INSTITUTE 
OF COM PARATIVE LAW, Etude comparative, passim. 
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the oldest and most stable constitutional system addresses the contradiction between 
protecting speech and safeguarding the public order. Perhaps the issue is more com-
plex than the headlines on a number of high-profile court cases would suggest? And 
perhaps - as in the case of the spilled coffee' and the micro-waved poodle". we might 
have to admit that our outrage was not only premature. but also based on prej udice 
and ignorance? 
In thi s brief survey. [ hope to show that the American approach to speech protection 
is by no means simplistic. Rather. it is based on a balanced system of categories and 
tests that have evolved over decades. It may well be that we do not always see eye to 
eye on which speech deserves protection and which does not. But instead of dismiss-
ing other approaches as inappropriate or we should see them as a salu-
tary opportunity to probe our own convictions and our own rules. If. subsequently. 
we arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary - at least for us - to pursue a more in-
vasive approach in regulating speech. so much the better. But then. this conclusion 
will be based on sound analysis. rather than pride and prejudice. 
Over-simplification and bias . however. is not a prerogative of Europe. Perhaps. the 
high opinion the United States has of its approach to free speech might suffer some 
probing and. perhaps. deflating along the way. Americans, after all . do not hold back 
their criticism either of what they perceive as illiberal. bigoted and. even worse, un-
necessary European restrictions on speech.' As a posi tive contras t, they point to the 
"quasi-religious standing'" that liberty and freedom of expression enjoy in the United 
States. According to the "American way", " the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression ... means freedom of expression in the fu llest sense." It is simply part of 
the American "culture that people are 'free to speak their mind ' and need not fear 
5 Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-024 19, 1995 WL 360309 (N M Dist. Ct, 18 
Aug. 1994), commonly referred to as the McDonnld's Cojjee Case. It is nOt generally known that !.he liti-
gant acwally suffcred third-degree bums lhat required skin-graft and an e ight -day Sla y in hospir..al. and thm 
she repeatedly offered to seuJe for a relative ly modest sum. Also, MeDonald' s had been aware that the cof· 
fee served in its drive-throughs was significantly holler than elsewhere, and had already resulLed in injuries. 
The 2.7 million US$ that thc jury eventually awarded as punitive damages were subsequenLl y reduced la 
480,000 US$ (plus 200,000 US$ compensatory damages) by the instructing judge. Appeals were lodged, 
but evenUlally setued oUI of conrl, wilh a further reduction of damages (cf. DIAMOND, Jury, 143, 145). 
The poodle - or, sometimes, eat - is an urban myth, lhe origins of which even predate !.he microwave-era 
(with a mcrc oven leading to the animal' s demise in earlier versions): WENGLOR2/RYAN, Ka\.Ze , 598, 599 er 
seq. 
7 Sec e.g. ALEXANDER, Illiberal Europe, 1,4: "Between Europe's speech laws, hypersensiti vi ty, and cynical 
demagoguery, conSlruclive criticism can become virtually impossible, and self-e<:nsorship is !.he nonn." -
In lhe same vein, an ACLU lawyer compared Frcnch legislation against Nazi propaganda on the intemet to 
speech reslrietions by the Taliban: "I n Novel Case, U.S, Court Says 'Non, Me rci' to french Government 's 
Artempt to Censor Yahoo! Content", avai lable at hnp:/lwww.aclu.orglprivacy/speech/ 
I 5125prs200 I 1 108.html (20 June 2008). Cf. Yahoo, {ne. v. La Ugue COli/re Le Raeisme el L'An/is! · 
mitisme. et al. , 145 F. Supp. 2d 1]68 (2001). 
DWORKIN, Deva luating Liberty, 7, 8. 
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that they will be· sanctioned for saying something that is offensive or unpopular.'" 
Given "the somewhat lesser protection of freedom of speech provided under the con-
stitutions of other democratic nations and under international human rights nonus". 
non-Americans apparently cannot but react "with astonishment at hearing how far the 
United States goes in protecting highly offensive forms of speech."" In short, 
"Americans are freer to think what [they] will and say what [they] think than any 
other people." 11 
In the following paragraphs, I will try to chart a passage between American hyper-
bole on free speech and the stereotypes cherished by Europeans. Hopefully, I will be 
able to demonstrate that free speech protection in the United States is not necessarily 
flawless. But neither does it correspond to the simplistic and undifferentiated ap-
proach of European lore. 
n. An Analysis of Free Speech in the United States 
The American approach to free speech is indeed more complex and intricate than the 
simple "free for all" it is sometimes alleged to offer. The apparently unequivocal 
command of the First Amendment - that Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of expression - needs to be qualified in two ways: Diachronically first, in 
order to show that the meaning of this constitutional provi sion changed significantly 
over time; and secondly, from a cross-sectional perspective to underline that today, 
American courts clearly do distinguish between different kinds of speech, some of 
which will not enjoy constitutional protection. 
A. Historical Developments 
a. Humble Begiunings: The First Amendment before World War I 
It is important to remember that while some of the state constitutions prior to 1787 
contained a bill of rights guaranteeing individual freedoms in general and the free-
dom of expression in particular, i2 the Federal Constitution adopted in Philadelphia 
SEDLER. Freedom of Expression, 377, 384. 
10 Id., at 377. 
11 LEWIS, Freedom, ix. 
12 Maryland Conslitution 1776, Declaration of Rights. § 38; Massaehusetts ConsLitulion 1780, Declaration of 
Rigths. An. XVI: Nonh Carolina ConstiCUlion 1776, DedaraLion of Rights, An. XV; Penllsylvani a Consti-
tution 1776, Declaration of Righls An. Xjl; Vermont Constitution 1777, Declaration of Rights Art. xrv; 
Virginia Constitution 1776, Bill of Rights § J 2. The sources are available at: 
http://www.yaJe.edullawweb/avalonllSlh.htm(20June2008). 
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did not. This was not a legislative slip. Some of the Founding Fathers rejected the 
very idea of a bill of rights: In their view, guaranteeing certain rights would imply 
that liberties in general could indeed be restricted by the State - otherwi se, there 
would not be any need for setting a barrier to State interference - and that rights not 
enumerated might be lawfully infringed upon by the central government." In addi-
tion, doubts were expressed as to the effectiveness of such bills: James Madison dis-
missed them as "paper barriers" that would not hold back overbearing State power. 14 
At the same time, nationalist supporters of the Constitution argued that a central gov-
ernment would represent the people and exercise sovereignty on their behalf and 
should, therefore, not be restricted in its actions in any way.I S 
Anti-federalists, on the other hand, insisted on the need of a bill of rights to "protect 
the just rights and liberty of mankind from the silent, powerful, and ever acti ve con-
spiracy of those who govern."" Thus, when the ratification of the newly adopted 
Constitution by all States remained uncertain, the prospect of a bill of rights seemed 
the best way to sway voters wary of too powerful a federal power. With the under-
standing that amendments would swiftly follow, the Constitution was narrowly rati-
fied and entered into force in 1788." 
Once the Constitution was in force, some members of Congress thought other things 
more important or pressing than to enact amendments immediately;" yet Madison, 
despite his earlier misgivings, fe lt bound to honour the promises made to the anti-
federalists." Qualifying his earlier objections to a bill of right, he now argued that 
even "paper barriers" had a tendency to "impress some degree of respect" for the 
rights they protected, and that they may be "one means to control the majority from 
those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.,,2o He introduced a draft bill, 
IJ HAM.ILTON/JAy/MADISON, Federalist Papers 00 . 84 (Hamilton), 524. These concerns were later addressed 
in the Ninlh Amendment. 
14 In a leHer 10 Thomas Jefferson; in reply, Jeffersoo poioted Out [iJal a bill of rights would alleas( allow the 
judieiary 10 check the other powers, LEWlS, Freedom. 8 er seq. 
15 CUNTON, United Slates Constit ution, 89 1,9 12. 
16 Proposal of Richard Lee (V A) to attach a Bill of Rjghls 10 the Constitu lioo, printed i.n JENSEN, Documen-
tary History, VO!. 13 , 447 ( 198 1). 
11 For a brief overview of the drafti ng and subsequent ratification process by state conventions, see CUNTON, 
United StateS Constituuon, 89 1, 897 et sqq. In breach of the Allicles of Confederation adopted in 1781 . 
which prescribed unarrim.ity for amendments, the new Constitution required ratification by nine States only 
to establish the new Un.ion. Rhode Islands only joined in 1790. after being threateued with exclusion . 
18 SuciJ as coUecting revenue: James Jackson (GA). House of Representatives. 8 June J 789. Annals of Con-
gress.442. 
19 James Madison (VA), House of Representatives, 8 June 1789: '"I wish I ... ) that those who have been 
friendly (0 IlK: adoption of this constituuon may have the opportuni ty of proving to those who were opposed 
10 it that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a Republican Governmenl l ... ]. It will be a desirable 
thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of che commurriry. any apprehensions that there are 
those among his countrymen who wish lO deprive them of the liberty for which chey valiantly fought and 
honourably bled" (Id., 31449). 
20 James Madison (V A), House of Representauves 8 June 1789, Id., at 455. 
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which eventually resulted in 1792 in the adoption of a Bill of Rights in the form of 
ten amendments to the Constitution ." The freedoms considered most pivotal took 
pride of place and were enumerated in the First Amendment: "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech. or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble. and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."" 
The Bill of Rights, as Justice Black has put it, "changed the original Constitution into 
a new charter under which no branch of government cou Id abridge the people's free· 
dom of press, speech, religion and assembly."" 
Yet the adoption of this command was not followed. as would be expected with hind-
sight, by the establishment of the broad protection of free speech that we associate 
with the First Amendment today. Instead, Congress passed the Sedition Act that 
would make seditious libel a federal crime in 1798.'4 The Act stated, inter alia, that 
"if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be writ-
ten. printed , uttered or published. or shall Jcnowingly and willingly assist or aid in 
writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing 
or writings against the government of the United States, or either House of the Con-
gress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame 
.. or to bring them .. into contempt or disrepute; or lo excite against them the 
hatred of the good people of the United States ... then such person ... shall be pun-
ished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceed-
ing two years."" This provision was obviously impossible to reconcile with an abso-
lute ban on any abridgement of free speech; however, with an argument rather 
fami liar by now, the government of John Adarns justi fied the curtai ling of liberties 
through the Sedition Act, and the Alien Act that preceded it,26 with an imminent ter-
rorist threat and the right of any nation to self-preservation. 27 In the House of Repre-
sentatives, an opponent mainw.ined that "thi s bill was in d.irect opposition to the Con-
stitution ; and that if a law like this was passed, to abridge the liberty of the press, 
lIOn the amendment process and the renewed debates between federalisLS and anti-federalists, see KAMINSKI, 
B ill of Rights, 887. 912. 
22 V.S. Const. Amend. I. In Madison's drafl, the FirSI Amendment read: "T he people shaJl not be deprived or 
abridged o f lhe ir right to speak, 10 write, or 10 publi sh their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one 
of the great bulwarks of Iibeny, shall be inviolable" (Annals of Congress, 45 1). 
23 New York Times Co. v. United SIOIes, 403 V .S. 7 13,7 16 ( 1970), J . Blac k:. eoneurri ng. 
24 An Act in Additi on 10 the Act. entitled "An Act for the Puni shment of Certain Crimes Agai nst the Uni ted 
S tates", 14 July 1798, I Stat 596 ("Sedition Ad'). 
1j Sed ition Act sect. 11 
16 Art Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 6 July 1798. I SLat. 577 (SljIJ in force today as 50 V .S.c. § 2 1-24). The 
two acts are usually referred to as the Alien and Sedition Aels. 
27 The Alien and Sed ition Aets were offic ially justified with an impeding war against Jaeobin Fra nce and the 
ensuing threat of terrorism by Freneh ci tizens in Ihe United Stales: LEWIS, Freedom, II et seq. In faet. the 
ACls were ai med at ensuring Federa li st rule and preventing the election of Thomas Jefferson to the presi-
deney in 1800. Neither a im was achieved. 
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Congress would have the same right to pass a law making an establishment of relig-
ion, or to prohibit its free exercise, as all [were] contained in the same clause of the 
Constitution; and, if it be violated in one respect, it may as well be violated in olh-
ers.,,28 The legislatures of Kenlucky and Virginia also branded the Act as unconstitu-
tional, and the latter called it an attack on "that right of freely examining public char-
acters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which 
has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual guardian of every other right."" 
The Sedition Act expired on 3 May 1801 and was not renewed;30 a general pardon 
was granted to all convicted under it. 31 Jefferson soundly rejected the very purpose of 
the Act when, in his inaugural address, he declared that "if there is any among us 
who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them 
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be 
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.,,32 
Yet the constitutionality of the Sedition Act had never been pronounced on by the 
Supreme Court;33 and even though the Act had sparked the first public debate on the 
scope of the First Amendment, this debate did not result in a broader construction of 
the protection of free speech. In Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, the 
Supreme Court soon made clear thal the Bill of Rights only applied on the federal 
level, but not on a state or local context.34 While the wording of the First Amendment 
("Congress shall make no law ... ") seems reconcilable with such a limited approach, 
other Amendments are coined in much more general terms?5 At any rate, from an 
equitable point of view, such a restrictive, literal interpretation seems odd if the over-
riding aim of civil rights should be the prolection of the individual from official inter-
ference - whether on a federal, state or community leveL Yet in the American tradi-
tion, state rights were as important, if sometimes not more than the rights 
of individuals. The Bill of Righls was originally intended as a proteclion against en-
croachment on state rights by the federal government: The Amendments did not pri-
marily enumerate individuals' rights vis-it-vis the public authorities; rather, they de-
28 Nathaniel Macon (NC), 4 July 1798, Annals of Congress, Fifth Congress, 2105, 
29 Virginia Resolution, 24 December J798, available at: hup:llwww.yale,edullawweb/avalonlvirres.hlm (20 
June 2008). The resolurion was drafted by Madison: LEWIS, Freedom, 17. 
)(I Cf. Sedition Aet seet. IV. 
JI JENKlNS, Sedition Aet, 154, 156. 
32 JEFFERSON, Inaugural Address, 3lO. 
JJ In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, howevcr, Justice Brennan observed that "although the Sedirion Act was 
never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history (New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1963». Jusrice Holmes had already SUIted in 1919 that he "had 
conceived that the United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedirion Act 1798, by 
repaying fines that it imposed" (Abrams et 01. v. United Slales. 250 V.S. 616, 630 (1918). 
!4 Cr. Barron v. Mayor & City Council af Balfimore, 32 US (Pet 7) 243 (l8.33), where the takings clause of 
the Fifth Amendment was held not to apply to city authorities. 
Cf. the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. 
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lineated the areas on which the (federal) government must not trespass'>· This was a 
largely value-neutral approach: It mattered only that the federal government did not 
pronounce on, e.g ., the freedom of the press; the states, on the other hand, were free 
to do so. 
Nevertheless, it could have been expected that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted 
after the Civil War. would finally lead to the direct application of the Bill of Rights 
on all levels." Yet the Supreme Court insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment's sole 
purpose was to protect former slaves, not to extend the scope of the Bill of Rights. 38 
Throughout the 19Lh century, the Supreme Court was utterly unsympathetic to the 
freedom of expression : Any speech could be repressed as long as it had a "bad ten-
dency" and would offend right-thinking people.J9 Only in 1925 did the Supreme 
Court. by dint of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. consider free 
speech a right that must not be infringed upon on both federal and state level 4 • 
b. Free Speech Reasserted 
The previous brief overview underlines that the sweeping command4 ] of the First 
Amendment was little mOre than an expression of intent for over a century: Not held 
to apply on state level and haphazardly protected on a federal level. where Congress 
ignored it at an early stage and the Supreme Court failed to enforce it in subsequent 
years. It might also be argued that. originally. the notion of free speech was not fun-
damentally different on both sides of the Atlantic. Congress. in passing the Sedition 
Act. relied on British COmmon laws on seditious libel ; and the Act itself was clearly 
36 Thus, the N inLh Amendment stales that " the powers nOl delegated to me United Slales by the Constitution. 
nOf p(otUbited by it 10 the S lales, are reserved 10 the Stales respecti vely, o r 10 the people." It is no coinci-
dence that the St.3tes a re mentioned firs!. 
)'l The Fourteenth Amendment states that "no Stale shalt make or enforce any law which shall abrid8e Ihl! 
privileges or imnwnilies of citizens of Ihe Untied Stales; nor shall any State de pri ve any person of life, lib-
erty. or property. without due process of law; nor deny 10 Ilny person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws" (e mphasis added). On the debate over the iment of the Amendme nt' s framers see BISHOP, 
Privileges and Immunites, 142. 
38 Slaughter.House Cases , 83 V.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). The Cou rt 's interpretation rendered the privileges 
and inununitics clause pointless: Slaughter-House Cases, 83 V.S . ( 16 Wall.) 36, 521 (1872), J. Field, dis-
senting. 
39 RABBAN , Free Speech. 38. 
40 Cillow v. People of New York, 268 V.S. 652, 666 (1924). Incidentally, the stark ch anges in the meaniug of 
some eo nstitutional clau ses should, in my view, make nousense of the heated debates on original ism aud 
nonoriginalism (cr. CHEMERINSKY, Constirntional Law, 17): Given these changes. how could it be claimed 
that the Constirnlion s hould nol evolve? Clearl y, a living nati on requires a livi ng constitution. [n this sense 
already Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 11. V.S. (4 Wheal.) 3 16, 407 , 415 (1819). In ad-
dition, in (he absence of Congressional o r state mate rials on the drafling and rati fication process of the Bill 
of RighlS, (he "orig inal intenf' can al besl be guessed. 
4 1 C f. Abrams etaJ. v. United Slales , 250 U.S. 616, 631 ( 191 8). J . Holmes dissenting. 
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based on a distinction between good (and pennitted) speech, and bad speech that 
warranted prosecution. 42 
Matters got still worse when the United States entered the First World War in 1917. 
Congress adopted the Espionage Act, which in many ways was reminiscent of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Espionage Act, which purported to protect the 
nation's war efforts," was intetpreted in such a broad way that "disloyal" words were 
considered sufticient for a verdict of guilty.44 Yet it is also in this period of time that 
we lind the solemn statements on freedom of expression that have now become syn-
onymous with free speech in the United States. It is, fundamentally, the liberal or 
utilitarian position put forward by John Stuan Mill in 1859, that in the absence of any 
certain knowledge of whether an opinion is true or faJse, humanity would be the 
poorer for its suppression:; and that only free discourse will aJlow us to ascertain 
which opinion deserves support.'" Learned Hand, then a District Judge in New York, 
was ahead of his time when in 1917 he stated in a Jeller to the editor of a socialist 
magazine that while he had found pans of that publication "extremely repellent", he 
"could conceive no possible excuse" for prohibiting the publication "excepl either 
that such matters must not be discussed, or that they must be discussed in a way 
which accords with the common standards of laste." "One aJternative," Hand contin-
ued, would be "tyrannous absolutism, the other tyrannous priggism.,,47 In a similar 
vein, Justice Holmes stated in 1918 that "when men have realised that time has upset 
many lighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the ground on which their 
wishes can safely be carried OU!.,,48 Indeed, that was, according to Holmes, "the very 
n LENNER, Two Consti(U(ions, 72, 73. 
o Aet of June 15, 1917, 40 Stal. 217. Subsequently, me Espionage ACI was amended by me even further· 
reaching Sedition Act of 1918 (Act of May 16, 19 18.40 Slat. 219). which was repealed by Congress in 
1921 . 
44 LEW\S, Freedom, 25. 
4S .. me pecuUar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, mat it is robbing me human race; posteriry 
as well as the existing generation; lhose who dissent from the opinion, still more lhan lhose who hold it. If 
lhe opinion is right, they are deprived of lhe opportunity of exehanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, 
what is almost as great a benefit, lhe clearer pereeption of and Uvelier impression of trulh, produeed by its 
collision with error" (MD...L, On Liberty, 20). 
46 "Complete Uberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in 
assuming iLS truth for purposes of action; and on no other lenns can a being with human faculties have any 
rational assurance of bei ng right" (Id" at 23) . 
• / Letter from Learned Hand lO Max Eastman, 27 June 1916, qUoted in GUNTHER, Learned Hand and the 
Origins. 719. 723 , n. 19. Eastman later rejected communism (cf. HA YEK, Serfdom, 280. 
48 Abrams el 01. v. United Slates. 250 U.S, 616, 630 (1918), J. Holmes dissenting. The defendants were Rus-
sian inunigrants, who had disLributed anarehist leaflets condemning U.S. intervention in revolutionary Rus-
sia. - Even though tfolmes is genera1ly credited for me great break-through in First Amendment adjudica-
tion. Judge Hand has probably a bener claim to this achievement. In PottersQn I'. Colorodo ex rei. the 
ANOmL')' General oft/te Stall! o/Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 ( 1906), Holmes was in fact still applying the ''bad 
143 
theory" of the American Constitution, of "an experiment, as all life is an experi-
ment." And if there were "any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively 
call[edJ for anachment than any other it is the principle of free thought - not free 
thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.,,49 
Tltis new approach was not immediately embraced by the Supreme Court: Holmes's 
famous remarks on free speech were made in dissenting opinions, and throughout the 
1920s his views (usually joined by Just ice Brandeis) were rejected by a majority.'O 
Yet in a first step in 1925, the First Amendment was held to apply on state level." In 
1931, a majority struck down as unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the display of 
a "red flag, banner or badge or any flag. banner, banner, or device of any calor or 
fann whatever in any public place ... as a sign ... of opposition to organized gov-
ernment."" Now, the majority opinion - delivered by Justice Holmes - stated that 
"the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that gov-
ernment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a 
fundamental principle of Our constitutional system.,,53 
tendency" lest of the 191h century. and in 191 8 he claimed that free speech stood "no diffe rently than free-
dom for vaccination (Letter from Oli ver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand, 24 June 1924, reprimed in 
GUN1l-IER, Learned Hand and the Origins, 719. Appendix 2. Holmes also insislcd on {he "sacred right to 
kilt the other fe llow when he disagrees". Letter from Leamed Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes. 22 June 
1924, reprinted in GUNTHER, Leam ed Hand and the Origins. 719, Appendix 1. For Ho lmes's subsequent 
transrormation into a champio n of free speeeh see RABBAN, Free Speech. 132 et .Iqq. It is like ly that Hand, 
who lOok a much more liberal view in Masses Publishing Co. 11. Potfen. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) ( 1917), 
played an impona.nt role in the change or Holmes' vicws, as did Harvard law professor Zechariah C haffee 
with his CHAFFEE, Freedom o f Speech, 932. 
49 United Stare.I 11. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1 928). In trus ease, a 51-year-old Hungarian linguist was 
refused naturalisation because, as a pacifisl refusin g 10 bear arms, she was "nable la be incapable or the at-
tachment for and devotion 10 the principles of OUI Constitution Ihat is required of aliens seeking nacuraliza-
tioll" (at 652). The Court observed that ' 'the influencc of conscien ti olls objec tors against the use or military 
foree in defense of the principles of our Government is apllo be more detrimental than their mere refusal to 
bear arms", and that "the fact that, by reason of sex, age or other cause, they rn.1y be unfi t la serve does not 
lessen their purpose or power to influence others" (at 651 ). By contraSt, Holmes called the applicant "a 
woman o f superior character and inte lligence, obviously more than ordinari ly desirable as a citizen of the 
United States", who should nOt be denied citizenship sim pl y because she be lieved "more than some of us 
do in the teaChings of the Sermon on the Mount" (at 653 el sqq., ], Hol mes dissenting,). 
:10 E.g. Whi'rley 11. California. 274 U. S, 357 (1926), where Holmes and Brandeis concurred for procedural 
reasons; UT/ited Stotes Y. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 ( 1928), 
j[ Cillo .... 11. People of New York , 268 U.S. 652 (1924). (See supra, note 40). However, speech protection was 
stilt very narrowly conslIUed, wilh the majoriry arguing that free speech without limi tation might become 
the "scourge of the republic" (at 667). Holmes, joined by Brandeis, dissented (al 672 er sqq.). 
52 Slromberg 11, California , 283 U.S . 359 ( 1930) , 36J (193 1). The nincleen-year-old appellant had been a 
supervisor at a summer camp: the charges concerned a daily ceremony at the camp, in which she supervised 
and directed eruldren raising a red flag. 
SJ Id" at 369. er. also De JOT/ge v. Oregon, 299 US 353 (1936) and Herndon 11. Lowry. Sheriff, )0 1 U.S. 
242 ( 1937), both overturning convic lions based on communist party membership. 
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Perhaps at this time, the First World War was remote enough for American society to 
feel sufficiently confident to overcome communist agitation on the merits, so to 
speak, rather than by repression. Yet that confidence was again shaken with the next 
upheaval of international affairs. The Smith Act of 1940" stood in the tradition es-
tablished by the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and the Espionage Act of 1917, 
threatening with up to twenty years of imprisonment anyone who "knowingly or wil-
fully advocates, abets. advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propri-
ety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the gov-
ernment of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of 
any political subd,ivi sion therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any 
officer of any such government."" 
Some suspected fascist, but mostly socialists and communists were thought to endan-
ger national security and prosecuted under the Smith Act.56 After the first round of 
arrests in 1941, the Supreme Court did not pronounce on these cases, either because 
it did not grant certiorari, Or because they were not appealed. When it did address free 
speech in the context of state laws during World War 11, it mostly followed its pre-
war, protective approach. 57 However, during the "Red Scare" that accompanied the 
Cold War, the Court did not prove to be the "bulwark" envisaged by the Founding 
Fathers.58 Rather, it obliged the other branches of government by supporting their 
fight against "communist subversion", In Dermis et al. v, United States, the Court 
upheld the conviction under the Smith Act of the leaders of the American Communist 
In that case, the mere plan to organise a communist party sufficed for a ver-
dict of guilty, which prompted a dissenting Justice Douglas to point out that if one 
starts "probing men' s mind for motive and purpose", "they become entangled in the 
law not for what they did butjor what/hey thought; they get convicted not for what 
they said but for the purpose with which they said it.,,60 Intent may well be relevant in 
other areas of the law, but not with speech, "to which the Constitution has given a 
'i4 Act of June 28, 1940.54 Slat. 67 1. subsequenLly J8 U.S.c. § 2385 (1970). 
Smith Act. Para J. 
'6 WIECECK, Domeslic AnLi-Communism. 375. 402. 
j7 Cr. e.g .. wilh regard 10 a Slale law requiring pupils to salute the nag: Delivering the opinion of the Court, 
JuSl ice Jackson Slated: '''Those who begin coercive elimination of dissem soon find lhemselves eXlemtinat-
iug dissemers. Compulsory unifiearion of opin ion achieves only lhe unanimity of the graveyard" (West Vir-
ginia SIGle Board of Education er al. v. Bamene et at.. 319 U.S. 624. 641 (1943 ), overtuming Minersville 
School District, Board of Education of Minersville School District, el al. v. Gobilis el al. , 310 U.S. 586 
(1940». The Court also defended freedom of thought in Schneiderman v. Ullile.t Slates, 320 V.S. 118 
(1942). where it reversed the denaturalisaLion of a member of the Communist Pa.ny, stating that ·'the eonSlj-
rulionai fathers, fresh from a revoillljon, did nOl forge a political strail-jaeket for the generations 10 come (al 
J)7 ). Laler. Schneidennan was o ne of the defendants in rates et al. v. United Stales, 354 U.S. 298 ( 1956) 
(see infra n. 63). 
'8 HAMILTON'fJAY!M:ADISON , Federalist Papers no. 78 (Hamilton), 476. 
W DelllJis et aL v. Ulli/ed Slales, 34 1 V.S. 494 ( J950). 
ClO Id .. al 583, J. Douglas. dissenti ng (original emphasis). 
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special sanction." " Referring to the "market of acceptance" for ideas, he went on to 
make one of the most forceful apologias for unfettered speech: "Full and free discus-
sion has indeed been the first article of our faith. We have founded our political sys-
tem on it. It has been the safeguard of every religious, political, philosophical, eco-
nomic, and racial group amongst us. We have counted on it to keep us from 
embracing what is cheap and false ; we have trusted the COmmon sense of our people 
to choose the doctrine true to our gertius and to reject the rest. This has been the one 
single outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol of freedom and 
equality. We have deemed it more costly to suppress a despised rrtinority than to let 
them vent their spleen. We have above all else feared the political censor. We have 
wanted a land where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and cultures 
of the world.',·2 
In 1957, the Court abandoned its broad construction of the Srrtith Act6 ' In 1961 , a 
conviction for membership in the Commurtist Party was once more upheld, but by the 
slimmest of margins.64 Eventually, the "pressure, passions and fears" of the Red 
Scare subsided, and the First Amendment liberties were restored "to the high pre-
ferred place where they belong in a free society."" In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the 
Court made it clear that prohibition of mere advocacy of ideas, even of the use of 
force or of law violation, was unconstitutional. OO Thus, Brandenburg offered a broad-
ly protecting formula, concluding a development that had started with Learned Hand, 
Holmes and Brandeis.67 
B. That Sweeping Command Restrained: Speech Limitations 101 
So far, so good, it would seem. We would all subscribe to the opirtion promoted in 
Bralloenburg that Ihe government has no business 10 tell citizens whallO believe and 
what to say. On the contrary, we believe, as Justice Brandeis put it , that "order cannot 
be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction ; that it is hazardous 10 
discourage thought. hope and imagination ; that fear breeds repression; that repression 
6 1 Id ., at 584. 
61 Id., al584 et seq. Douglas pointed o\Jllhm only jf bmh the eKecUllvc and legislative themselves had failed 
in their dUly could the country, as lhey clai med, be "on the edge of grave peril" - a conclusion he was un-
willing \0 make (at 589). In a separate dissem, Justice Black considered the Smith Act "unconstitulional on 
ils face and as applied" (J . Black. dissenting, at 579). 
6l YOles et uL v. United SlateS, 354 U.S. 298 (1956) . reversing and remanding the conviction of leaders of the 
Communist Party of California by slating lhat the Smith Act did not prohibit "advocacy arxl teaching of 
forcible overthrow as an abstract principle" (at 318), Justice Black. joined by Justice Douglas in partial dis· 
sent. ins isted that the Ac( violated the First Amendment (at 339 el sqq. and especially 343 et seq.). 
M Barenblatl v. United Slates, 360 U.S. 109 (1958). Cr. also NOlO v. Uniled Slales, 367 U.S. 290 (1960). 
M Dennis er al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 . 58 1 (1950), J. Black dissenting. 
66 Brolldenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444. 447 ( 1969) (overruling Whitney v, California. 274 U.S. 357 ( 1926)). 
67 GUNTHER, Learned Hand and the Origins, 719. 754 . 
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breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opponunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that 
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones."" And we shudder at the thought of 
how far the United States has so blatantly deviated from this ideal during the years of 
McCarthyism and the communist which-hunt. 
Unfonunately, the defendant in Brandenburg was not a starry-eyed ideali st hoping to 
funher world revolution and the rule of the proletariat. He was not even a die-hard 
Stalinist advocating one-pany rule. No, he was white supremacis t and an outspoken 
Ku Klux Klan leader, who maintained that Jews and blacks should be forcibly sent to 
Israel and Africa respectively."9 
Few would believe - or wish to see - such utterances protected by free speech guar-
antees in Europe. Clearly, An. 10(2) ECHR would be applicable.'o Is this not proof 
that the limitless freedom promised by the First Amendment is per se inappropriate in 
some instances, even if the promise has not always been fulfilled ? The question is, to 
some extent, based on a misconception. It would be a stark over-simplification to 
maintain that the American couns are indifferent towards harmful speech. Despite 
the sweeping command of the First Amendment, free speech has never been bound-
less in the Unites States. Instead, the Coun has repeatedly stated that "it is a funda-
mental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which 
is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, 
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unreslricted and unbridled 
license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the pun-
ishment of those who abuse this freedom."" 
Rather, the U.S. courts apply an inlricate system of tests and categorisation in estab-
lishing whether the First Amendment has been infringed upon or not. The limits thus 
imposed can be divided into two sets: The flfst one based on matters of content, i.e. 
on wlwt is said, and the second one depending on fonnal aspects, i.e. on Iww the right 
to speech is exercised or restricted, respectively. 
6S Whitney v. Califomia. 274 U.S. 357, 375 et seq. (1926). J. Brandeisconcurring. 
lh Brondenburg v. Ohio, 395 V.S. 444 (1969). The faClS of the case are reminiscent o f Jersild v. Denmark. 
(l994) 19 EHRR J I Application no. 15890/29.23 September 1994 (1994): In bolh cases. racist remarks 
were recorded by journalisls and sut>requently broadcasted. In Jersild. a journalist had interviewed three 
yo ullls who were members of lhe "GreenjackelS" (a racist association in Denmark modelled upon the Ku 
Klux. Klan). 
1'0 In Jersi/d v. Denmark. it was Dot [he right Lo free speech of the Greenjackets mal was upheld. butlhat of the 
journalists reporting lheir views. The Greenjackels did not appeal against the lines imposed (cf. Jersild v. 
Denmark, (1994) 19 EHRR 1 / Application no. 15890/89.23 September 1994 (1994). Para. 14). 
11 Gillow v. People of New York, 268 V.S. 652, 666 (1924) : cf. also Frohwerk \I. United Stales, 249 U.S. 204, 
206 (1918); Whitney v. Cai!fomio, 274 V.S. 357. 373 (1926) : Roth v. Uni/ed SlaleS, 354 V.S. 476. 483 
(1957). 
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a. Limited Protection or No Protection: Incitement to Illegal Activity, Ob-
scenity and Fighting Words 
The most famous test for constitutional speech restriction was set out in Schenk v. 
United States in 1919, where the defendants were prosecuted under the Espionage 
Act for obstructing the enlistment of servicemen (they had printed circulars claiming 
that under the Thirteenth Amendment, the draft was unconstitutional). Justice 
Holmes stated that "the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a 
man in falsely shouting ftre in a theatre and causing a panic."" According to Holmes, 
the criterion was "whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.':7J 
This "clear and present danger" test permits to punish speech that creates (or, in one 
version, intends to create)74 an immediate risk of significant harm. It remained the 
tenet of the Court's approach to incitement speech through the following decades, 
even though it was not always consistently applied." In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the 
Court significantly narrowed its test for permitting restriction on speech advocating 
illegal actions. It held that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or a law vio-
lation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action.,,76 Thus , advocacy may only 
be punishable if intended to result in an imminent breach of the law and, in addition, 
if such intent has a chance of succeeding. 
Consequently, incitement to illegal activities is not always banned, nor is it always 
permitted; rather, it is "a question of proximity and degree·,n This gradual approach 
also applies to several other areas or subjects of speech." Conversely. certain sub-
jects are held never to enjoy First Amendment protection. Most notable among the 
latter are obscenity and so-called fighting words. 
n Schenk v. United Stales, 249 U.S. 47 , 52 (1919). It is questionable, however, where thi s analogy did justice 
to the ease: The question was rather whether the government should have the power to ban mUllering fire in 
a thealre. too, for (he efforts of the defendants amOUllled to little more. 
7J Id. , a152. 
14 Abrams et 01. v. United Stares, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1918), J. Holmes, dissenting. 
1S In the 1920s llnd 1930s, the Coun instead used a "reasonableness approach", under wltich govemmem 
restriction was permissible as long as it was reasonable (er. e. g. Giflow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 667 ( 1924)). The lhreshold for restriction was lowered funner in Dennis et al. v. Uniled Stoles. 34 1 
U.S. 494 ( 1950). 
7f> Brondenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), emphasis added. 
71 Schenk v. United StOles. 249 U.S. 47.52 ( 1919). 
78 E.g. commereial speech, which was granted gradual protection in Bige!ow v. Virginia. 421 U.S. 809 (1974) 
(where me Coun held that advenisemCIIIS (or abonion servicC$ enjoyed free speech proteetion). Broadcast-
ing aJso has limited First Amendment protection: Federal Commllnications Commission v. Pacifica Fo/III-
dOlion et al. , 438 U.S. 726 (1977). 
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The leading case on obscenity is Rotl! v. United States." The Court stated that "all 
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, COn-
troversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full 
protection" of the First Amendment. A historical analysis of the First Amendment, 
however, led the Court to consider "obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
importance" and therefore unprotected'O Obviou sly, it is difficult to clearly define 
"obscenity": The Court stated that it was not synonymous with sex (which it consid-
ered "a great and mysterious motive force in human life" and "a subject of absorbing 
interest to mankind through the ages"); rather, obscene material "deals with sex in a 
manner appealing to prurient interests. ,,81 Despite these conceptual difficulties, the 
Court has consistently ruled that obscene materials are not protected by the First 
Amendment. 82 
Roth was decided in 1957. In 1942, the Court had already designated another cate-
gory of speech "the prevention or punishment of which have never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem."" In ChapUnsky, it stated that words "which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace", 
i.e. " fighting words", may also be prohibited." "Resort to epithets or personal 
abuse," the Court added. "is not in any proper sense communication of infonnation or 
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would 
raise no question under that instrument.,,85 
Yet while the Court has never overruled Chaplinsky, it nonetheless has reversed 
every conviction for fighting words ever since.86 In doing so, it has relied on the cri-
teria of vagueness and overbreadth. 
b, Vagueness and Overbreadth 
The rule of law generally requires tha, regulations are formulated in a clear and un-
ambiguous way, so that the addressees know what is permitted and what not. Overly 
vague laws violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of 
79 ROlh v. United Slate.s, 354 U.S. 476 (957). Roth conducted a business in New York publishing and selling 
photographs. magazines and books. He was indicted for mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an 
obscene book. in violation of the federal obscenity statute. 
so Id. , al 484 . The Court also pointed to international Jaw 10 support this view: Agreement for the Suppression 
of the Circulat..ion of Obscene Publications, 4 May 1910, amended 4 May 1949, 47 U.N.T .S. 161 
Id ., at 487. Prurient, in rum, implies "a tendency 10 e:-.:eit.e lustfullhoughts" (al 487, n. 20). A more detailed. 
(h.ree-Lier Lest was introduced in Miller v. Califomia. 413 US 15 (1972). 
82 Cf. e.g. Aiexollder v. United States. 509 U.S. 544 (1992). 
83 Chaplillsk)' v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568 , 57 1 et seq ( 194 1). 
Sl Id ., at 572. Chaplinsky, a Jehova's Wilness, told the city marsball of Rochesler, NH. thal he was "a God 
damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist", and thal the "whole govenuneot of Rochester (were] Fascists or 
agenls of Fasci sts" (at 569). 
Id. , aI572 , quot..ing Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U.S. 296, 309 el seq. 
86 CHEM ERINSKY, Constitutional Law, 1002. 
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whether free speech is at issue. In the area of First Amendment freedoms however, 
the standards of permissible statutory vagueness are particularly strict, as these free-
doms are "delicate and vulnerable. as well as supremely precious" to society." An 
overly vague restriction on speech would not allow a reasonable person to tell what 
speech is prohibited. and to act accordingly. The threat of sanctions based on vague 
laws would "deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sa nc-
tions." Because freedom of expression needs "breathing space to survi ve", the gov-
ernment "may regulate in the area only with narrow speci ficity.,,88 
A similar. although not necessari ly congruent test requires speech restrictions not to 
be overbroad. A law is Qverbroad if, in a field where some restrictions are constitu-
tional (e.g. incitement), it imposes more restrictions than the constitution permitS.89 
Such overbroad regulations threatening the exercise of First Amendment rights with 
prosecution have a "chilling effect" on free speech. regardless of the prospects of 
success or failure of the prosecution.90 The defence of overbreadth nUght even be 
invoked by someone whose actual speech is not protected. but who is prosecuted un-
der a law that would. in other cases, be unconstitutionally restrictive. Thus. someone 
prosecuted for fighting words under a statute that prohibits all forms of political 
speech could still challenge the constitutionality of Ihe statute - even though fighting 
words can be constitutionally banned9 1 
In such cases, however, overbreadth has to be substantial, which presupposes a "real· 
istic danger that the statute itself will significantly compronUse recognized First 
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court."" In addition, the Court al-
lows overbroad laws to be construed narrowly by lower courts in order to avoid in-
validation.93 
87 National Association for the Ad..,allcemem of Colored People ..,. Button, Allomey General of Virginia. et 
01. ,371 U.S. 41 5, 432 et seq. (1962). 
88 Id .. at 433. A Virginia Jaw prohibited solicitation of legal business by an organisation which retains a law-
yer in connection with a third-party aClion. This wou ld have prevented the National Association from sup-
porting black litigants in asserting their civil rights. 
89 CHEMERlNSKY, Constitutional Law, 943. 
<)0 Dombrowski el of. v. Pjisler, Chaimultl, Joint LegiS/alive Commit/ee on Un,American Acti."ilies of (he 
Louisiana Legislature, el al., 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1964) . 
91 Cr. supra, note 84. Thus, overbreadth provides all exception to the general prohibition of third-party stand-
ing: Boles el 01. v. State Bor 0/ Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (197 6). For lhi s reason, the Supreme Court con-
the overbreadth doctrine "strong medicine": Broadrick et 01. 1'. Oklahoma et al., 41 3 V,S. 60 1, 613 
(1972). 
92 Members of the City Council of Ihe eiry of Los Angeles el aL v, Taxpayersfor Vincelll el at.. 466 U.S . 789. 
801 ( 1983), For a detailed discussion, see FAllON, Overbread th, 853, 
9] Osbome v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990): An Ohio statute combating child pomography prohibi ted the pos-
session of nude photographS. The Ohio Supreme Court conS{TlJed the law to only cover phOloS of a pomo-
graphic nalu rc, as otherwise the law wou ld nave been overbroad. 
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c. Content·based and Content-neutral Laws 
Overbreadth and vagueness apply to restrictions that are pennissible in principle but 
phrased in an unconstitutional way. Yet there are regulations that by their very sub-
ject, rather than by their drafting, fall foul of the constitutional protection. " ... above 
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.,,94 Thus, the 
government may for instance prohibit billboards based on location or size, but not on 
the message they convey. The latter limitation, based on content of a billboard, would 
be presumptively invalid, because "government may not grant the use of a forum to 
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less 
favored or more controversial views.,,95 
Content-based restrictions of speech aim at the very essence of the free market of 
ideas: They try to regulate what goods may be traded on the marketplace, and rule out 
certain items from being offered and advertised at all. Thus, instead of certain ideas 
disappearing from the shelves simply due to a lack of demand, content-based legisla-
tion would, if freely permitted, introduce a planned economy where only merchandise 
approved by the authorities is available - which, eventually, may well result in shops 
running out of stock, and people queuing up in front of completely empty shelves. 
But that does not mean that content-based restrictions will always be considered un-
constitutional. After all, a market needs some rules that ensure fairness and transpar-
ency. The food police, for instance, do not generally ban goods - it merely ensures 
that any food sold is not endangering consumers' health. Similarly, the First Amend-
ment allows for content-based restriction, but only if they meet a strict scrutiny test: 
They have to serve compelling state interests, must be narrowly tailored and offer the 
least restrictive means to realise that interest;96 otherwise, it will be unconstitu-
tiona1.97 However, content-based restrictions are admissible if "within the confines of 
9<l Police Depar1melll of the City of Chic age et al. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971). The Court held that a 
law that pennined labour pieketing outside schools, but prohibited other peaceful picketing, was unconstitu-
tionally content-based. 
Id., at 96. 
96 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., er al. v. Federal Communications et al., 512 U.S. 622, 641 
et seq. (1993); HARE, Free Speech Adjudication, 49, 52. An additional element was introduced through the 
so-called "secondary effects" anaJysis: a prima facie coutent-based restriction may be considered contcnt-
neutral if it pursues a content-neutral purpose (cf. City of Renron el at. v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., eF al., 475 
U.S. 41 (1986), where an ordinance limlting the numbers of adult movie theatres was upheld: Even though 
content-based (adult movies), the ordinance was said to address (alleged) secondary effects of these theatres 
such as crime and a fall in property vaJues and in the "quaJity of urban life" (at 48». For a rejection of this 
approach, see HARE, Free Speech Adjudication, 49, 71. 
'n An example for an inadmissible content-based restriction is Ashcroft v. ACLU: The Child On-Line Protec-
tion Act required wcbsites with adult content to introduce an age verification procedure. The Court upheld a 
preliminary injunction and remanded the case for trial on the merits; it considered it likely that respondents 
would win because there were less restrictive alternatives (namely filter software) to age verification 
(Ashcrojt, Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union et al., 542 U.S. 656, 666 er seq. (2004). 
ISI 
the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the 
expressive in terest, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudica tion is 
required .,,98 
In a further subdivision, content-based speech restriction is divided into viewpoint-
based and viewpoint-neutral restric tions. The latter limit speech for both supporters 
and opponents of an argument: So neither pro-choice advocates nor anti -abortion ac-
tivists would be allowed to hold manifestations in the vicinity of an abortion clinic. A 
view-point based rule, on the other hand, would allow only one of two or several 
sides to voice their opinion in a certain place or a certain manner. Thus. it was held 
unconstitutional to limit the right to wear an army uniform to theatrical productions 
favourable to the armed forces.99 In another prominent example, a law prohibiting 
"flag desecration" was struck down: It allowed flag-burnings as long as they were not 
meant to cause offence (e.g. to dispose of a torn flag), and was thu s clearly view-
point-based .'oo 
Content-neutral regulations - such as the limits on the size of billboards mentioned 
above - pose fewer problems. The coun "has often noted that restrictions of this kind 
are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information." lol They fall into the category of what could be termed administrative 
rules, which regulate speech regardless of its content. Content-neutral rules only have 
to pass intermedi ate scrutiny.l02 
98 New York v. FeriJer, 458 U.S. 747 (J 981 ) al 764, where the Supreme Coun held that distribution of mate-
rial depieting sexual conduct with minors was categorieally oULSide First-Amendment-protection. 
99 Schachl v. United Stales, 398 U.S. 58 (1969). Under a federal statute, civilians were not al lowed to wear 
an American military uniform (18 U.S.c. § 702) , unJess for a theatrical production which "does not tend to 
discredit that armed forces" (10 U.S.c. § 772(1)) . Petitioner, donning a unifoml, perfomled a skit outside 
U.S. military instirutions LO protest the Vietnam war. The Coun first held that the skit was indeed a theatri-
cal perfonnance ("It may be [hat the performances were crude and amateurish and perhaps unappealing, but 
Ihe same thing can be said about many theatrical perfomrances", al61 er seq.). It al so held that the clause 
prottibiting uniform use for "discrediting" performances, "whieh leaves Americans free 10 praise the Viet-
nam war, but can send people like Schacht to prison for opposing it", was unconstitutional (at 63). 
100 Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397. 411 (1988). TIle Coun also held that burning a flag was e)lpressivc con-
dner protected by the First Amendment 
101 Clark. Secretary of tM Inferior, el al., v. Commurliry for Creative Non-violence er of, 468 U.S. 288 , 293 
(t 983). 
IIn Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communicarions Commission et al., 5J 2 U.S. 622, 641 
(1993) . Und er imermediate scrutiny, a regulation will be sustained if "it furthers an importarll or subsLantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free e)lpression; and if 
Lhe incidemal restriction on alleged First A.mendmem J"reedoJIl5 is no greater than is essential 10 Lhe further-
ance ofLhal interest" (Uniled Slates)!. O'8riell, 391 V .S. 367 (1967), 337 (J968), 
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Ill. The Pitfalls of Too Sophisticated a System 
This short overview of First Amendment methodology'OJ should make it clear that 
free speech in the United States is a much more complex issue than the simplistic 
free-for-all as which it is often perceived in Europe. If anything, it could be argued 
that this methodology is sometimes overly complex, and to an extent that categories 
and tests have become an end in itself, rather than supporting common sense and the 
realisation of justice. 
For instance, it seems odd that the Court holds content-based restrictions to be pre-
sumptively invalid , while at the same time, it declares certai n categories of speech 
such as fighting words or obscenity unprotected due to their very content. This con-
tradiction has not escaped the Coun. In RA V. v. SI. Paul, it has tried to blunt the an-
tinomy by declaring that categories such as fighting words are not "entirely invisible 
to the Constitution"; rather, such areas of speech "can, consistently with the First 
Amendment, be regulated because of lheir constitutionally proscribable content. ,,104 
The Court then went on to say that a content-based category must not itself make a 
content-based distinction. 
RA V. v. SI. Paul dealt with a city ordinance that prohibited the display of cenain 
symbols, such as burning crosses or swastikas, which one knows or has reason to 
know arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, colour, creed, 
religion or gendeL '05 The Court subsumed the proscribed conduct under fighting 
words. It held that the ordinance was facially invalid under the First Amendment be-
cause it prohibited only certain fighting words , while permi tting others. 100 A racist 
was barred fro m painting swastikas on walls; a rabid opponent of globalisation, on 
the other hand, would have been permitted to utter fighting words directed against 
big corporations. Worse, the ordinance was also view-point based: Proponents of ra-
cial equality and tolerance would be allowed to use fighting words to combat racis ts, 
while racists could not retoIl in kind. 107 
Of course, one might wonder what could possibly be wrong with banning racist 
speech, even if other fighting words are still permitted. Surely, it would be better to 
ban at least one evil , rather than to worry that other evils might feel hard done by? 
10J Several additional aspects, such as the issue of prior constraint, or the various forms of expression covered 
by the First Amendment, have been omined here. For an overview, see CHEMERINSKY, Constitutional Law, 
949. 
104 RA V, v Cjty of St. Paul, Minnesola, 505 V.S. 377, 383 (1991), original emphasis. 
105 Sf. Paul Bias-Moti vated Crime Ordi nance. St, Paul. Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990). 
106 RA V. v Ciry of St. Paul, MinnesOla , 505 V .S. 377. 39 1 (1991) . 
107 "Se Paul", the Court stated. "has no such authority (0 license one side of a debate (0 right freestyle, while 
requiring the other la follow Marquis of Queensberry mles" (id .• 3t 392. referring 10 the boxing rules en-
dorsed by the 9 r1t Marquis of Queensberry in 1867). 
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From the American side of the argument, this question misses a central aspect of the 
First Amendment, which first and foremost has to guarantee equality among all opin-
ions on the marketplace of ideas. ' 08 The problem with this approach is that unfortu-
nately, some tend to be more equal than others. The black neighbour who sees a cross 
burning in his front yard does, presumably, not draw much comfort from the fact that 
he, too, would be permitted to bum a cross. Similarly, a fascist parade in a lewish 
village will always be more threatening. more baleful than some Jews picketing a 
Nazi gathering. Perhaps the Aristotelian adage that different things should be treated 
differently would lead to more equitable results? '09 Even the staunchest defenders of 
liberty recognise that a line has to be drawn to protect the defenceless against abuse, 
and that there is a prima facie case for punishing anyone who commits ac ts hurtful to 
others. 1JO 
To this, the Supreme Court would reply that it is not to take sides in the competition 
of ideas, that indeed "the First Amendment recognizes no such ting as a 'false' 
idea.,,[1I In fact, if an opinion gives offence, "that consequence is a reason for ac-
cording it constitutional protection.,, '12 Laudable sentiments, certainly - but does the 
Court really abide by its own words? Over the years, it has restricted speech in many 
ways. It has held that obscenity did not enjoy any protection, even though it had to 
admit that obscenity is not a clearly defined concept. If "one man's vulgarity is an-
other man's lyric'" 13, perhaps a third man' s greatest treasure would seem indecent 
beyond measure to a fourth? I 14 
I do not mean to propagate protection for obscene material s. In most jurisdiction 
some limits are imposed on lewd materials, and rightly SO. 115 But in my view (and 
presumably to many others), racist speech is not worthier of protection than obscen-
ity. What is more, in both cases essentially moral judgements are made on which 
IOS KARST, Equality, 20. For thi s reason, the Supreme Court has held Ihal a st.atute banning cross-burning is 
constitutional as long as j[ "does not si ngle ou t for opprobrium onty that speech directed toward one of the 
disfa vored (opics." As long as aU evil s were treated equally, as long as it did "nol matter whether an indi-
vidual burned a eross with intent to intimidate because of the vietim 's race, gender, or religion , or because 
o f the vietim's politieaJ affiliation , union membership, or homoseltuaJity", the First Amendment is not vio -
lated (Virgi" ia 11. Black et al. , 538 U.S. 343. 362 (2002) (internal quotation marks ommitted)}, 
'00 Cr. Aristotle. Nieomaehean Ethics. Book V, ) n Ob. 11 3 1a. 
110 MD..L, On Liberty. L4. 
", New York Times Co. 11. Sulli.·an . 376 U.S. 254 . 51 ( 1963). 
111 Id .• al 55. 
I1J Cohen .'. California , 403 U.S. 15.25 (1970). The Califo rnia Penal Code prohibited malieious and wilful 
dislmbances of the peaee by o ffensive conduct (§ 415). The appellant was convicted to r wearing a jacket 
bearing the words "Fuek the Draft" in a eorridor of the Los Angeles Courthouse; the Court reversed. 
"4 cr. Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476. 498 ( 1957). J. Hatlan. dissenting: "Many jllries might find Ihat 
Joyce's ' Ul ysses' or Boeeacc io's 'Decameron' was obscene. and yet the conviction of a defendant for sell-
ing either book would raise. for n-.e. the gravest constitutiona l problems. for no such conviction could con-
vince me, without more. Ibat these books are 'utterl y without redeeming social importance'''. 
In Cf. e.g. An. 197 Swiss Penal Code; §§184- 184<: German Penal Code. 
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speech is "utterly without redeeming social importance". " · The conclusion that ob-
scenity fall s "categorically''! 17 outside the First Amendment, that it is essentially 
"non-speech". is by no means self-evident It is a deliberate decision to restrict cer-
tain utterances and to penmit others. 
There is nothing wrong with such decisions. On the contrary, it is impossi ble to avoid 
imposing some limits. But it seems more salutary (and honest) to openly acknowl-
edge them as what they are, instead of extolling the vi rtues of an allegedly unique 
American Way.118 Besides, restrictions on speech in the United States are not limited 
to the field of obscenity or fighting words. As pointed out above, during times of ac-
tual or perceived threats to national security. the Unites States has often restricted 
speech that. with hindsight, did not pose a threat to the nation. Why, for instance. did 
American courts not rely on the vaunted market mechanisms to dispose of commu-
nism?119 
IV. Conclusions 
We see that certain restrictions are applied to speech on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The approach might be slightly di fferent: In the United States, not everything is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. but whatever is protected, is so almost absolutely. 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights (and most European constitu-
tions), the net of speech protection is cast wider, but might then be narrowed, with a 
considerable portion of the catch thrown back into the water. 
But some di fferences remain, at least with respect to speech that falls within the 
range of the First Amendment In the United States, more emphasis is put on liberty, 
on the idea that there are certain areas that should remain free of government inter-
ference. It would be a grave misunderstanding to think that Americans are secretly 
sympatheti c of racist ideologies or other forms of hate speech. and that for this reason 
they refu se to restrict it. I believe that nothing could be farther from the truth. But 
they do have the con fidence - or at least confess it - that the citizenry will , in time, 
116 Cf. ROlh v. United Slafes. 354 U.S. 476, 484 ( 1957). 
11 7 Miller v. California , 4 13 U.S. 15, 23 (1972). 
liS er. supra n. 9 and accompa nying text. 
11 9 Cf. DeltJtis et al. v. United Slales, 34 1 U.S. 494, 588 ( 1950), J. Douglas dissenting: "Conutlunism in the 
world scene is 1'10 bogeyman; but CommWli sm in this COuntry as a political faclion or party plainly is. Com-
munism has been so thoroughly exposcd in this country UUH it has been Crippled as a political fo rce. Free 
speech has destroyed it as an effective political party. It is inconceivable that those who went up and down 
Ulis cou ntry preachiog the doctrine of revolution which pelilioners espouse would have ally success .. .. The 
country is not in despair; (he peoplc know Soviet Communism; (he doctri ne'of Soviet revoluti on is exposed 
in all its ugliness and the American people want none of it." 
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make their own sound judgement on which ideas ought to prevail, and which should 
be forgotten. 
As expounded above, this confidence was frequently shaken. But the historical over-
view should also have made it clear that over time, the limits of liberty in general and 
freedom of expression in particular have been steadily pushed back. While the First 
World War saw heavy punishment of people demurring in the slightest to the war 
effort, the Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged that these restrictions went too 
far. Relapses did occur, particularly in the first decade of the Cold War, when prose-
cution for perceived "thoughtcrimes" was rampant. But again, the law, and the 
courts, recovered from the frenzy. The next time the government wanted to cunail 
speech for the sake of national security, the Supreme Court held that "". security is a 
broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fun-
damentallaw embodied in the First Amendment.""· And as much as we may resent 
occasional American jingoism, no one can deny that domestic oppoSition to the Iraq 
war is strong and vociferous, with manifestation being held right in front of White 
House. '" And nO one has been arres ted for shouting fire in a crowded theatre. 
What conclusions to draw, then? Perhaps most importantly, th at the American ap-
proach is not fundamentally different from other approaches to protect free speech 
and limit its excesses. So prominent an advocate of free speech as Judge Hand has 
acknowledged that "a society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom 
soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of on ly a savage few.,,'22 On 
this, we agree, even if sometimes wi th differing emphases. 
But from these very differences in emphasis we can also draw some valuable lessons. 
Firstly, the American insistence on equality for speech should caution us no to as-
sume too easily that a clear line can be drawn between good speech and bad speech . 
For justice we may strive, but we should always pennit ourselves, and others, to 
question the appropriateness and even-handedness of our endeavours.'" It is some-
times convenien tly easy to rely on, or hide behind, moral absolutes. But we may 
come to appreciate the willingness to discuss differing views openly without immedi-
120 New York Times Co. 11. Uniled Sloles. 40J U.S. 713, 719 (1970). J. Black, concurring. The Federal Gov-
ernment unsuccessfull y lried to prevent the Times and the Washington Post from publi shing the so-caJ led 
Pentagon Papers, a classified "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viel Nam Po licy". 
121 CLEMETSON. Threats and Responses; Disse nt; Protest Held Accross the COUntry to Oppose War in Iraq. 
New York Times, II December 2002. 
122 H AND, The Spirit of Libel1)' ( 1944), 190. 
123 Cf. K£L<;EN, Gerechtig):eit. 49, ch. rx , J2: "Absolute Gerechtig):eit ist ein irrationales Ideal. Vom Stand-
punkt rationaler Erkerultnis gibe es nUl menschliche Interessen und daher In teressenskontlikte. FOr deren 
LOsung stehen nur zwei Wege ZUI VerfLigung: entweder das eine Interesse auf KOSlcn des anderen "tu be-
friedigen. oder cincn KompromiB zwischen bciden herbeizufLihren. Es ist nichl mOglich zu beweisen, daB 
nur die eine. lucht aber die andere U1sulIg gerechl isl. Wenn soz.ialer Friede als hOchster Wen vorausgeselzt 
wird, mag die KompromiBlosung als gerechl erscheinell. Aber auch die Gereehlig):eil des Friedens iSI nur 
eine relative. keine absolute Gerechligkeil.·· 
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ately crying foul; rather than always relying on the government to ban unsavoury 
opinions, we might have more confidence that they will be refuted on their merits and 
in open cliscussion. An example of this approach is provided by the Supreme Court 
itself: Dissenting judges have an opportunity (0 state their objections to the majority 
opinion. Dissent does not weaken a judgement's power of persuasion. Rather, the 
admission that other views may be held and need not be suppressed adds to the le-
gitimacy of a court's ruling. In addition, dissenting opinions may offer new perspec-
tives to a court: A minority view might, over time and through the force of conviction 
and through persuasion, sway more and more judges until it commands a majority . 
• • • 
Thus, the First Amendment and its accompanying methodology give important ad-
vice on how to approach the difficulties that free speech engenders. It does not keep 
all its promises - the freedom it offers is not unlimited. In some instances, it draws 
the limits on speech in ways that are difficult to accept for Europeans. But even if we 
sometimes disagree on where exactly la demarcate protected from unprotected 
speech, we agree on the fu ndamental principle: That the freedom of expression some-
times needs to be reined in. The people of Europe and the United States have done so 
in differing ways and to various degrees, based on their respective traclitions and his-
torical experiences. There is nothing wrong with that. 
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